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THE PLATONIC CORPUS 
From any perspective, Plato's dialogues are extraordinary. Others 
have tried to write philosophical dialogues, frequently in imitation 
of his. Indeed other associates of Socrates had already used the genre 
before Plato adopted it; bits and pieces, along with titles, remain. 
But the Platonic dialogues remain essentially sui generis, whether 
taken singly or as a whole. There are somewhere between twenty-
five and thirty-five genuine works which, while always returning 
to ethics and politics, between them cover a vast range of topics, 
and cover them in often startlingly different ways; always, however, 
using a cast of characters that excludes the author, even in disguise. A 
main feature is that they define - and would later be taken as having 
defined - what philosophy itself is, not just in terms of its subject-
matter but in terms of method and attitude or approach. This they do 
chiefly by exhibiting philosophy in action; or rather, typically, by ex-
hibiting a philosopher - usually Socrates - going about his business, 
often in confrontation with others (teachers of rhetoric, sophists, 
politicians, poets) who dealt with the same subject-matter but in 
different, non-philosophical ways. 
Quite what this thing 'philosophy' is, on Plato's account, will 
emerge in due course. First, it will be helpful to review the extent 
of the corpus, the parts of which are laid out below in an ancient or-
dering. (The ordering - at least of the first thirty-six items, arranged 
in nine 'tetralogies' - is probably due to the Platonist Thrasyllus of 
Alexandria in the first century AD.) 
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Diagram A: The contents of the Platonic corpus 
Approximate lengths are given in 'Stephanus' pages. These are the 
page numbers of the several volumes of Henri Estienne's 1574 edi-
tion of Plato, used by all modern editions and translations to provide 
a standard referencing system. (Each Stephanus page - see p. 17 - is 
divided into five sections, a-e,· however, line numbers within sec-
tions are frequently specific to particular editions, so may vary.) One 
Stephanus page typically contains around 530 words, slightly more 
than the equivalent of one page of this book. Alternative titles, and 
some obscurer but regularly used abbreviations are given in square 
brackets. 
Diagram A 
Title 
1 Euthyphro 
1 Apology 
3 Cr ito 
4 Phaedo 
(Phd., Phdo) 
5 Cratylus 
6 Theaetetus (Tht.) 
7 Sophist 
8 Statesman 
(Politicus, Pol., 
Pit.) 
Topic 
On piety 
Defence speeches at 
trial, re-created (not a 
dialogue) 
On the citizen and the 
law 
On the soul: does it 
survive death? 
On the relationship of 
language to reality 
Three formally 
unsuccessful attempts 
to define knowledge 
(Sequel to Theaetetus.) 
What is a sophist? 
Falsity, not-being 
(Sequel to Sophist.) 
What is it to be a 
statesman? 
Main speaker(s) 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Visitor from 
Elea 
Visitor from 
Elea 
Pages 
14 
25 
1 2 
61 
58 
69 
53 
55 
(cont.) 
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(cont.) 
Title 
9 Parmenides 
io Philebus (Phlb.) 
i i Symposium 
12, Phaedrus 
(Phdr.) 
r3 Alcibiades 
(First Alcibiades, 
Ale. I) 
14 Second 
Alcibiades (Ale. II) 
15 Hipparchus 
16 (Rival) Lovers 
17 Theages 
18 Charmides 
19 Laches 
20 Lysis 
Topic 
On 'Forms'; with 
philosophical training 
exercises 
On pleasure and the 
good; method 
On eros (passionate 
love); speeches at a 
drinking party held at 
Agathon's house 
On eras (passionate 
love) and the art of 
logoi (speaking and 
writing) 
A kind of introduction 
to Platonic 
philosophy? 
A miniature version of 
Alcibiades! 
On greed 
On knowledge and 
authority 
On Socrates and his 
'divine sign' 
On sôphrosynë 
('self-control'?) 
On courage 
On 'love' (or 
'friendship': philia) and 
human motivation 
Main speaker(s) 
Parmenides 
(from Elea), 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Aristophanes, 
Agathon, 
Socrates, 
Alcibiades 
et al. 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Pages 
41 
57 
52 
53 
32 
14 
8 
7 
1 0 
24 
23 
2 0 
Title 
2i Euthydemus 
(Euthyd., Eud.) 
22 Protagoras 
23 Gorgias 
24 Meno 
25 Greater 
Hippias (Hippias 
Major, Hi. Ma. ) 
16 Lesser Hippias 
(Hippias Minor, 
Hi. Mi.) 
27 Ion 
28 Menexenus 
(Mx.) 
29 Clitopho 
30 Republic (Rep., 
Resp. ) 
Topic 
Philosophy meets 
'eristic' sophistry 
On knowledge and 
excellence/virtue: 
philosopher meets 
sophist 
On rhetoric: 
philosopher meets 
sophist (Gorgias) and 
pupils 
On excellence/virtue, 
and whether it can be 
taught 
On beauty/fineness: 
philosopher meets 
sophist 
Better to go wrong 
deliberately or without 
meaning to? 
On poets, poetry, 
knowledge: 
philosopher meets 
rhapsode (performer of 
epic) 
A funeral oration (said 
to come from Aspasia, 
Pericles' mistress) 
On Socrates' 
shortcomings as 
teacher 
On whether justice 
pays; construction of 
an idealized city; 
tripartite soul; theory 
of education 
Main speaker(s) 
Socrates 
Socrates, 
Protagoras 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Clitopho 
Socrates 
Pages 
37 
53 
81 
30 
24 
14 
12 
16 
5 
295 
(in 10 
books) 
(cont.) 
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(cont.) 
Title 
31 Timaeus 
32 Critias 
33 Minos 
34 Laws (Leges, 
Leg.,Lg.) 
35 Epinomis 
36 Letters 
(Epist., Ep.) 
37 Definitions 
38 On Justice 
39 On Virtue 
40 Demodocus 
41 Sisyphus 
Topic 
An early Athenian 
'history'; the cosmos 
and the origins of 
mankind 
(Fragment, continuing 
Timaeus. ) Ancient 
Athens' defeat of 
Atlantis 
On the nature of law 
An imaginary city 
constructed, with legal 
system and theory-
extended theological 
excursus in book χ 
(Appendix to Laws. ) 
On wisdom, and how 
it is to be achieved by 
the governing council 
of the city 
[Ranging from one 
fifth of a page to 28 
pages] 
Some Academic 
definitions of 
philosophically 
important items 
Various questions 
about justice 
Can virtue be taught? 
A small collection of 
Academic discussions? 
On knowledge and 
deliberation 
Main speaker(s) 
Timaeus 
(mostly a 
monologue) 
Critias 
Socrates 
An Athenian 
visitor to Crete 
The Athenian 
visitor (as in 
Laws) 
Plato 
(alleged author) 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Pages 
76 
16 
9 
345 
(in 12 
books) 
2 0 
55 (13 
letters) 
6 
3 
4 
7 
5 
Plato 1 0 3 
Title 
42 Halcyon 
43 Eryxias 
44 Axiochus 
Topic 
Interpretation of a 
myth 
Is money a good thing? 
On the prospect of 
death 
Main speaker(s) 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Socrates 
Pages 
W 
14 
8 
With probably or certainly spurious items removed, the list looks 
like this, in a fairly standard modern ordering: 
Diagram B: A standard modern ordering of the 
undoubtedly genuine Platonic works 
Diagram Β 
Early (alphabetical order) 
Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Lesser Hippias, 
Ion, Laches, Protagoras, Republic (Book 1); plus ('transitional'?) 
Euthydemus, Greater Hippias, Lysis, Menexenus, Meno 
Middle (suggested chronological order) 
Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic (Books n-x), Phaedrus, 
Parmenides, Theaetetus 
Late (suggested chronological order) 
Timaeus-Critias, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus, Laws 
Or, in the ordering given by mainly nineteenth-century studies of 
Plato's style ('stylometry'), which begin from the reasonably firmly 
established fact that Laws was written last: 
Diagram C: The undoubtedly genuine Platonic works as 
grouped according to purely stylistic criteria 
Each group, until the last-placed Laws, is in alphabetical order. 
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Diagram C 
Group ι (presumed earlier) 
Apology, Charmides, Cratylus, Crito, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, 
Gorgias, Greater Hippias, Lesser Hippias, Ion, Laches, Lysis, 
Menexenus, Meno, Phaedo, Protagoras, Symposium 
Group ii (presumed transitional to later dialogues) 
Phaedrus, Parmenides, Republic, Theaetetus 
Group m (later): 
Philebus, Sophist, Statesman, Timaeus-Critias, Laws 
PLATO'S LIFE 
Diagram Β makes more ambitious claims than Diagram C about the 
shape of the corpus, by connecting it with a particular view about 
the way Plato's thought developed; that is, by ordering the dialogues 
at least partly according to 'doctrinal' content. Two theses in partic­
ular have been seen by modern scholars as relevant to establishing 
relative dates of composition. One is the thesis that the soul has 
three parts or aspects, the relevance and importance of which for is­
sues of dating will be discussed on pp. 120-2 below. The other thesis 
is about the existence of a special set of entities collectively called 
'Forms' (eidë) or 'Ideas' (ideai) that lie beyond ordinary phenomenal 
existence. This thesis is so fundamental to any reading of Plato that it 
requires immediate introduction; but in any case a basic understand-
ing of the concept of a Platonic 'Form' is needed for the argument of 
the present section. 
What, then, are Platonic Forms? This is not an easy question to 
answer. One reason is that Plato never presents us with a single, 
comprehensive account of the 'theory' (as scholars frequently call 
it) - that is not his style (see especially p. 108 below). Another is 
that he may perhaps not have anything stable enough to be called a 
'theory' at all (pp. 113-19 below). But this much one can say. Forms 
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are, first of all, those things that the philosopher aims to grasp when 
he or she attempts to understand anything important, whether good-
ness, or beauty, or justice (i.e. what it is to be good, beautiful, or just), 
or the cosmos as a whole (see p. 109 below). Secondly, each Form is 
what explains, is even cause of, those particular things at the phe-
nomenal level that share its name, and 'participate in' or 'resemble' 
it. But, thirdly, Forms exist independently, not only of particular, 
phenomenal things but also of minds, whether human or divine. 
They can be pictured as located in some region beyond the reach of 
the senses, although in fact they are non-spatial and non-temporal, as 
well as non-corporeal. Insofar as they are eternal, they are themselves 
divine; and unlike phenomenal objects, which change and come into 
and pass out of existence, they are and remain exactly what they are, 
thus representing an appropriately stable set of objects for knowl-
edge. Aristotle, looking back from the perspective of his own views, 
tends to treat Platonic Forms simply as objects of definition, uni-
versale, that have been mistakenly 'separated' from particulars, but 
the true picture will certainly have been more complicated. In dif-
ferent contexts in Plato, Forms have different faces: sometimes they 
do indeed look like universals, but perhaps more often they look like 
ideal paradigms or limiting cases (as e.g. when particulars are said to 
'resemble' them); sometimes they may plausibly be interpreted as an 
underlying ordered structure resembling a set of physical laws (see 
p. n o below). 
For present purposes, however, what matters is that it is the per-
ceived moment, or process, of the introduction of Forms as clearly 
independent of, and prior to, particulars that primarily determines 
the shape and membership of the group of dialogues called 'middle' 
in Diagram B. On the view that this diagram represents (a view 
which by contrast generally downplays the importance, in this or 
any other context, of the introduction of the tripartite soul), the early 
or 'Socratic' dialogues make no significant metaphysical commit-
ments. But then, in the 'middle' dialogues, Plato moves decisively 
away from his teacher, to develop - among other things - the hall-
mark, 'classical', theory of Forms. The shift from 'middle' to 'late', 
too, has frequently been seen as an extension of the same story: 
now Plato allegedly starts to have doubts about, or even rejects, the 
'classical'idea of Forms (see pp. 115, 116 below, on the Parmenides), 
along with other constructions of the 'middle' period. 
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This reading is undoubtedly psychologically plausible, but is 
rather weakly supported. For example, while Diagram C is compati­
ble with Diagram B, it falls short of corroborating it: three of the main 
'middle' dialogues, Cratylus, Phaedo and Symposium, actually be­
long to the first stylistic group. A second and perhaps more serious 
consideration is that we have hardly any reliable and independent 
evidence about the way Plato's life and thinking developed; and to 
infer - in the way the proposed reading does, almost entirely - from 
the dialogues' content to the history of the creative mind behind it 
comes dangerously close to the methods of the ancient biographers, 
who with hard facts unavailable tended to fill out anecdotal evidence 
with whatever it seemed plausible to derive from the corpus. 
Nonetheless, as we shall see (pp. 119-22 below), a modified evolu­
tionary or 'developmental' model of interpretation remains a useful -
perhaps even necessary - alternative to the opposite, or 'unitarian', 
pole of interpretation, even granted that the latter would in itself 
be perfectly compatible with the stylometrists' discoveries (Diagram 
C). The unitarian tendency, treating the corpus as a more or less 
static unity, was in fact the norm until the modern period, which in 
terms of the interpretation of Plato begins in the nineteenth century. 
Despite this, 'developmentalism' too has historical roots of a sort (in 
Aristotle), and in any case it would surely be surprising if someone 
who lived and thought - philosophically - until the age of about 
eighty did not sometimes find it necessary to change his views. 
The important things we know for sure about the author of the 
works collected under the name 'Plato' are roughly these: that he 
was born in the early 420s BC to a wealthy father by the name of 
Ariston (his mother's name is in some doubt); that he had a close 
relationship, at least on an intellectual level, with Socrates,· that he 
spent the larger part of his life in Athens, without interference from 
the authorities despite the profoundly anti-democratic nature of his 
extensive political writing; that he founded a philosophical 'school', 
the Academy, which was to survive as an institution for research and 
reflection, and for teaching, for at least three centuries; that from 367 
until his death, he had Aristotle with him in the Academy; and that 
he died in 347.1 Later chapters in this volume will deal with the 
fortunes of Platonism in its various forms, and, most immediately, 
with Aristotle, who was in many ways the most faithful Platonist 
of them all, despite some central points of disagreement. However 
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elusive Plato may be, and have been, from a biographer's point of 
view, there is no doubting the difference he made, as a single indi-
vidual, to the history of philosophy. Even Stoicism, that great rival of 
Platonism in the early days of both, can be detected rifling Platonic 
dialogues to provide material for its own systematic constructions. 
F O R M S , T H E P H E N O M E N A L W O R L D , A N D 
P H I L O S O P H Y ' S S E A R C H FOR T H E G O O D : S O M E 
C E N T R A L P L A T O N I C I D E A S 
Astonishingly, we appear to have all the works that Plato ever wrote 
and wanted read. The dialogues are also the first complete philo-
sophical works that we possess from the ancient world; practically 
everything from before then, and much of what comes after, we have 
only in the form of fragments. In terms of preservation Plato fared 
much better even than the three canonical Athenian tragedians, only 
a selection of whose work survived (Aristotle did better in terms of 
volume, but only because he wrote more). This by itself is testimony 
to Plato's importance for later generations. Even those works that our 
evidence tells us were less read than others survived along with the 
rest, and new works - more or less Platonic, but not by Plato - went 
on being added until the first century BC. 
That Plato's texts survived so well is a reflection not only of his 
status, but of the nature of the corpus itself. Firstly, its parts seem 
to have been designed to be circulated, some widely, some perhaps 
less widely. Secondly, whatever it is that Plato stands for, it is not 
easily to be got from any single dialogue or set of dialogues (indeed, 
because of the kind of writing these represent, it is not easily to 
be got at all: see below). No two dialogues cover exactly the same 
ground, and as Diagram A will confirm (pp. 99-102 above), not many 
either significantly overlap or even refer to each other. In this sense 
knowing Plato means reading him all. Every dialogue tends to be 
surprisingly different from every other, except in the sense that each 
puts the same heavy demands on readers. To put it another way, it is 
hard to know what to discard; and presumably all the harder if you 
are inclined, as many readers of Plato have been, to suppose that the 
corpus as a whole contains a systematic world view. 
Such a reading is encouraged by both the range and the nature of 
Plato's coverage. His topics, or those of his characters, stretch from 
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the macrocosm, the cosmos itself, down to the microcosm of the 
individual human soul; and any index to the Platonic corpus will 
include substantial reference to any serious subject that would have 
been familiar to an educated ancient audience, as well as many that 
would not. At the same time the treatment of each of those subjects 
will tend to be connected, somehow, to that of others. When the 
eponymous main speaker of the Timaeus claims that the world is as 
'good' as it can be, what he means is essentially that its parts compose 
an ordered system, and this pair of associations, of things in the 
world with 'goodness' and of 'goodness' with order, is fundamental 
to the Platonic project as a whole. What that project seems to promise 
above all is a synoptic account of everything - something far more 
ambitious even than any search, in modern science, for a unified 
field theory, insofar as the aim was to explain individual and society 
in the same breath as the cosmos itself, and using the same or similar 
principles. 
At the same time the parts of the Platonic corpus themselves are 
strikingly unsystematic. The extended, continuous account of the 
physical world in the Timaeus is practically unparalleled; for the rest, 
readers must put things together for themselves from conversations 
or snatches of conversation here and there. Thus if the corpus does 
contain a worked-out system, it has an odd way of showing it. Indeed 
main speakers, and especially Socrates, typically qualify whatever 
positive ideas they may advance as provisional and lacking author­
ity. It is an enduring characteristic of Plato's Socrates that he claims 
to know nothing, and to have got anything substantial from some­
where else; even Timaeus' account is only a 'likely story', or 'likely 
account' (see below, p. no), even if we are told to 'look for noth­
ing further' (Timaeus 29a). It is perhaps the main challenge for the 
interpreter of Plato to explain this paradox of a promise of system 
combined with a form of exposition that seems almost designed to 
exclude it. 
That, however, is a topic for other sections (pp. 116-22 below). 
For now, it is sufficient to note that there are explanations available, 
the oldest of which exploits the nature of Socratic teaching as por­
trayed in the dialogues: a kind of teaching that helps the recipient to 
find his own way, first or simultaneously purifying him of his mis­
taken conceptions. So too, the claim is, Plato intends his readers to 
do the hard work for themselves. This, we may note, will also pro­
vide a 'unitarian'-style explanation of the mixture in the corpus of 
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so-called 'Socratic' dialogues, often apparently negative in outcome, 
with more positive works like the Timaeus. Interpreters who take 
this sort of line, as most did for two millennia, can then safely get 
on with looking for Platonic 'doctrines'. (What follows is merely one 
perspective on such 'doctrines',- there is no implication that this is 
how the Platonic interpreters in question saw them.) 
The world, then, makes sense in terms of system, order, har-
mony. From here the trail leads in several directions. Firstly there 
is a strong mathematizing strand in Plato, which expresses itself es-
pecially in talk about principles, appropriated from Pythagoreanism: 
Limit, or the One, and the Unlimited (also, or later, called the 'Indefi-
nite Dyad'), with countable plurality emerging from the 'imposition' 
of the former upon the latter. This is the kind of talk found in the 
Philebus (16c ff.), and according to Aristotle's and other evidence 
was much in vogue in the Academy after Plato's death. The Timaeus 
also provides mathematical accounts of the structure of the rational 
World Soul and of the elements and their relationships (see below, 
chapter 10, p. 279). 
But parallel with this mathematical approach, and perhaps in prin-
ciple or aspiration ultimately reducible to it, are two others. The 
Form of the Good, described in the Republic as 'beyond being, in 
authority and in power' (vi, 509b: perhaps because explaining the 
existence of other things?),2 is compared in the same context to the 
sun, giving rise to everything intelligible as the sun gives rise to 
everything that comes-to-be in the physical realm; at the same time it 
is Forms - once these, or rather 'copies' of them, have been 'received' 
by the Receptacle, the obscure 'place' that allows them to acquire 
physical location (Timaeus 486-53c) - that somehow explain the 
particular phenomenal objects which share their names with them. 
The emergence of the physical universe can then also be described, 
again in the Timaeus, as a process of the co-operation of reason 
and necessity, with reason as a divine and provident Craftsman or 
'Demiurge' imposing a pattern (the Forms) on recalcitrant materi-
als (27e ff., 47e ff.; cf. chapter 10, p. 279). 'Necessity' is represented 
both by the fact that the realization of the Creator's intentions fre-
quently requires purely instrumental and in themselves undesirable 
means, and, secondly, by the inherent instability of the 'Receptacle', 
which the Creator took over already containing 'traces' of the ele-
ments in disordered motion J52d-53b: he imposes the mathematical 
structures). 
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If this is still only a 'likely story', what it describes will never-
theless be something like the truth, at the level of ultimate reality. 
Forms in the Timaeus are represented centrally by the Form of Living 
Creature, the model for the cosmos, itself a living creature animated 
by a rational soul, whose motions are made visible by the heavenly 
bodies. The Form of Living Creature encapsulates the structured rela-
tionships that are assumed to exist between Forms, and are mirrored 
in the relationships between things in the phenomenal world. Being 
an image, or a likeness, of this Form, the world is capable of revealing 
something of the nature of the Form,· all the same, a likeness is not 
the same as its original, and an account based exclusively on a like-
ness will similarly fall short of one based on the corresponding orig-
inal (it will be merely 'likely').3 When Socrates bans observational 
astronomy from the higher mathematical education of the future 
philosopher-rulers in the Republic, in favour of a study of 'real move-
ments', 'true number' and 'true figures' (vn, 529c-d), he is perhaps 
relying on the same distinction between embodied structures and 
relationships and the same structures and relationships considered 
in isolation from such embodiment, and so in purely mathematical 
terms. This is the context of Plato's challenge - or of the story of 
his challenge - to the mathematicians to find a model that would 
account for the actual movements of the heavens (see chapter io, 
p. 291). 
The individual, as a compound of body and soul, is an organic 
part of the physical universe. At the same time the soul, in its best 
state, will mirror the order of that universe, with the movements of 
its rational part mimicking the movements of the World Soul. Souls 
inhabit bodies, but are themselves incorporeal; divine souls move 
the heavenly bodies. All of this gives a literal sense to the ideal of 
'becoming like god' (homoiösis theöi), most eloquently expressed in 
the Theaetetus (i76iL-ijja). Interpreted more generally, 'becoming 
like god' means becoming as rational as possible, gods being purely 
rational entities. 
The analogy can also go the other way, as it does in the myth -
fantasy - of the reversal of the world in the Statesman (268d-274e). 
In the middle of the long series of divisions (on the method see 
pp. 115-16 below) that will ultimately lead to a definition of the true 
statesman, the Visitor from Elea embarks on a story which, he ad-
mits, is out of proportion to the job it is introduced to do (illustrating 
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a wrong turning in the divisions). 'You remember those old stories', 
he says to Socrates' younger namesake, 'about the portent that ap-
peared during the dispute about the kingship between Atreus and 
Thyestes - the reversal of the movements of the heavenly bodies? 
Well, the truth about this has never been told... ' There are, it seems, 
two recurring eras in world history, one golden, belonging to Cronus, 
and one belonging to Zeus, in which we ourselves live; and these two 
eras are separated by a shorter period of reversal,4 when the deity has 
'let go of the steering oars of the universe', at the appointed time. 
In this period, which begins and ends with great destruction, dead 
bodies come back to life from the earth, and get smaller as time 
goes by, until they disappear altogether. What causes the reversal? 
We are given two explanations: firstly, we are told that the cause is 
the bodily nature of the whole - nothing bodily can remain in the 
same condition for ever. This explanation fits well enough with the 
Timaeus. But the second seems rather different. The reversal is now 
attributed to the 'innate desire' of the physical universe (272e), pent 
up during the time the guiding deity has been in control; ultimately, 
however, the universe remembers the teaching of its 'craftsman and 
father', 'the one who put it together' (273b), and returns to its proper 
course. This second explanation recalls a common image in Plato, of 
a divided soul in which the natural rule of the rational part is perma-
nently under threat from the desires of the irrational part or parts.5 
In the Statesman myth, the world is not just a living creature, as in 
the Timaeus, but like a human creature, its instability caused not 
by 'necessity' and the imperfection of a craftsman's materials, but 
by its own desire, which takes it in the direction opposite to the one 
favoured by reason. However the metaphor of the Statesman, which 
treats the cosmos as if it were a human agent, is natural enough if we 
take into account that according to the Timaeus the lower parts of 
the soul are themselves a product of necessity (that is, specifically, a 
by-product of the insertion of reason into a body), and that irrational 
desires can be treated - as they are in the Phaedo - as the desires of 
the body. 
Society too can be analysed along the same lines. The great 
thought-experiment of the Republic, in which Socrates designs a city 
or polis from the ground up, establishes a direct analogy between city 
and individual souls (Books 11-iv). City and soul each consist of three 
parts, rational, 'spirited' and appetitive: the city naturally consists of 
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wise rulers, brave soldiers, effective producers, while internal con-
flicts in the soul show it to contain three separate kinds of desires 
with separate sorts of objects,6 the rational kind of desires being nat-
urally dominant over the other two.7 Allow either of the two lower 
parts - but especially the appetitive - to get out of hand and usurp 
the ruling function of reason, and the result will be a diseased city8 
and a diseased individual. Since many individuals' own reason is too 
weak to exercise its natural rule, reason's rule must be established 
over them from outside,· and that will mean philosophical rule, exer-
cised by those who have successfully emerged from the cave in which 
the rest of humanity finds itself, into the light of truth, and of the 
Good.9 
The universe, then, of which we are parts, is structured; it is as 
the Socrates of the Phaedo hoped to find it, 'bound together by the 
good' (99c-d). And the good that binds the whole is the same good 
that we all seek in our lives, insofar as we are rational. Nor is this a 
mere question of coincidence of structures. A series of arguments in 
different dialogues attempt to show that our souls will survive our 
deaths, and indeed will last for ever, passing on from one incarna-
tion to another (for the Pythagorean origins of this doctrine, cf. p. 51 
above). Insofar as 'we' are identical with our souls, we are no mere 
ephemeral creatures, but permanent parts of the universe. What 
is more, when freed from the body the soul can either take flight 
through the heavens or plumb the depths of the earth, depending on 
the quality of its conduct in its previous incarnations. The eschato-
logical myths in Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus depict a 
cosmos which might have been designed to provide for the appro-
priate reward and punishment of human beings. They are, of course, 
myths, and we should expect myths not to tell us literal truths (the 
Statesman myth is a case in point). Moreover, they differ in tone, 
in register, and in the degree to which they borrow motifs from tra-
ditional myths. All the same, as Socrates suggests in the context of 
the Phaedo myth, the truth will be that or something like that,10 
and indeed in the Platonic universe there is nowhere much else for 
discarnate souls to go except up or down.11 What such stories sug-
gest, without their having to establish it, is the idea of a universe 
whose structure somehow exhibits the goodness, justice and beauty 
that - as Plato's Socrates urges - should be exhibited in human lives; 
and exhibits them even (perhaps) to the extent of providing, through 
its geography or in other ways, those rewards and punishments 
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that human institutions may fail to provide for lives well or badly 
lived. 
Thus even if man is not the highest thing in the world, neverthe-
less on Plato's account he has a central role in it. Thanks to his dual 
nature, he can become like god, remain merely human, or even be-
come an animal. What makes the difference between a first-grade 
life and a less successful one is philosophy, which is both what 
enables one to see what a good life actually is, and the main con-
stituent of such a life. (The irrational parts will function mean-
while, but tamed in the way that the state education system of 
the 'beautiful city' of the Republic is envisaged as taming its citi-
zens,· similarly in the Magnesia of the Laws.) Philosophy makes the 
difference, for even granted everything that is claimed by Socrates 
and others about the way things are in the universe, that will 
provide no more than a rough framework for deciding how ex-
actly we are to live our lives from day to day. Being told that one 
should live a good/structured/harmonious/rational life, in imitation 
of god/nature, is all well and fine; but what exactly is to count as 
that kind of life, and how do I ensure that the particular decisions I 
take from day to day will contribute to it? No wonder Socrates goes 
on refusing to claim any knowledge, and insisting on the need for 
further thought. No wonder, either, that the importance of philoso-
phy is the central theme of the Platonic corpus as a whole. We may 
identify as many other 'doctrines' in Plato as we like, but to miss 
this one is to miss the main point. 
PHILOSOPHY AND TRUTH 
Discovering the good will require systematic rational inquiry, and 
this is what the dialogues above all illustrate and promote. Such 
inquiry is nearly always in Plato treated as involving face-to-face 
discussion - conversation - with others; indeed expertise in ratio-
nal inquiry is just the 'art of conversation', or 'dialectic' (dialektikë 
technê), and even internal thought takes the form of posing and an-
swering questions (see chapter 1, p. 27). What the philosopher wants 
is to know the truth; since he doesn't have it, he must go looking 
for it; and where better than in other people? But he can't assume 
they have it either. He will test and challenge them as closely as he 
tests and challenges himself, and will allow them to do the same to 
him.12 
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Given this emphasis on the importance of talking to others, there 
might be a temptation to attribute some kind of intersubjective no-
tion of truth to Plato; and all the more so in that he seems to reserve 
real wisdom for gods alone. If a 'god's-eye view' is forever beyond 
us, then perhaps we shall have to settle for what we, as sharing at 
least in a part of the gods' rationality, may agree (rationally) with 
each other to be the case. Yet in the end this looks an unlikely diag-
nosis of Plato's position, given his evident commitment to Forms as 
the ultimate objects of knowledge: the Good Itself, Beauty Itself, the 
fust Itself, and so on. Plato is a 'platonist', who believes in objective 
truths. 
How then do we acquire access to these, if at all? It cannot be 
just by talking to people, because others, like the sophist brothers 
Euthydemus and Dionysodorus whom Socrates encounters in the 
Euthydemus, also spend their time in conversation. What matters 
is the kind of conversation one has. The brothers are mere experts 
in the 'eristic' branch of sophistry, the art of verbal dispute, and the 
Euthydemus shows at some length what the difference is between 
this and real dialectic: most importantly, the real dialectician, the 
philosopher, will be interested in making distinctions where the 
'eristic' deliberately avoids making them - even if he understands 
them - because all he wants is to win the debate. 
In short, the philosopher argues philosophically, that is, with the 
aim of finding the truth (the philosophos is, literally, the 'lover of 
truth'), whereas the eristic argues to win. What Plato's Socrates is 
after is arguments that would convince any rational person, just by 
virtue of that person's being rational. Given that there are only people 
to try arguments out on, and that human capacities are limited, no 
agreement between particular individuals that a point has been won 
can be counted as final. Nor does the fact that a conclusion has not 
so far been refuted mean that it will not be refuted in the future. 
Socrates' habit of 'examining myself and others' (Apology 38a) is 
often treated by moderns as if it were a kind of therapy; but purifi-
cation from false belief is only a condition, and side-product, of the 
search for truth. The question Socrates puts to himself and others is 
'Do we have reason for believing that?' And there can be no better 
standard than what reason has so far demonstrated (Crito, e.g. 46b), 
the strongest conclusions so far reached (Phaedo 100a). It is consis-
tent with this that about the only figures recognized unqualifiedly as 
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philosophers in Plato apart from Socrates are Parmenides and a visi-
tor from Parmenides' home city of Elea (modern Velia). Parmenides 
stands out for the austere rigour of his argument, even though Plato 
thought his conclusions wrong, and spent a significant chunk of 
the Sophist letting the visitor from Elea show why (namely that a 
proper handling of being and difference will offer a way in which 
'what is not' can be - something that Parmenides had denied).13 
In the dialogue named after him, Parmenides becomes the critic of 
Socrates' handling of Forms, while admitting that they are a neces-
sary condition of thinking and speaking. The second and larger part 
of the dialogue consists in what is announced as a training exercise 
(i35d-i36a) in deduction, starting from certain hypotheses ('if (the) 
one is. . . ' ; 'if (the) one is not...'); only Parmenides could give Socrates 
such lessons in argument. Protagoras is treated with some respect, 
especially in the Theaetetus, but practically every other available 
figure with any intellectual pretensions tends to be dispatched -
along with, and because of, their methods and/or aims - with the 
full force of Socratic irony. The second part of the Phaedrus intro-
duces a theory of philosophically based rhetoric that will allow the 
truly expert speaker to cater for different kinds of audiences (as Plato 
does, implicitly, himself? ); story-telling, not teaching, is said in the 
Statesman to be appropriate for the masses (304c-d); and the Laws 
advocates that the laws themselves be accompanied by persuasive 
preludes, the given examples of which surely fall short of the kind of 
hard argument associated with the philosophical enterprise in other 
dialogues. But otherwise that hard argument is treated as the re-
quirement, however elusive really definitive arguments may seem 
tobe.14 
If the philosopher/dialectician will evidently always employ 
question-and-answer, question-and-answer can employ different 
types of systematic method: one or more kinds of hypothetical 
method (Meno, Phaedo, Republic), and the method of 'collection and 
division' that Phaedrus and - more allusively - Philebus describe 
and Sophist and Statesman employ. The latter method is one of def-
inition: 'collection' is a matter of trying to identify the most general 
item under which the definiendum falls, while division breaks down 
that item in successive stages until the definiendum is reached, the 
definition consisting of whatever it is in each division that is kept 
for further division. But of course 'below' the definiendum, which 
I l 6 GREEK AND ROMAN PHILOSOPHY 
will itself be a general item, will be the indeterminate plurality of 
particular instances of it. The method clearly presupposes a stable 
and structured reality, to provide the material for division; there is 
layer upon connected layer stretching down from the highest unity 
to (what we might call) the infima species, which - as Socrates puts 
it in the Philebus - it is our task as philosophers to uncover before 
'abandoning unity to infinity' (i6e), i.e. the phenomenal world that 
results from the imposition of limit or unity, in its various forms, on 
the unlimited. 
But dialectic is still a matter of talk, of using language, and nei-
ther language nor the mind that uses it obviously possess any natural 
or necessary connection with the things to which they purport to 
refer. This problem Plato had inherited.15 One solution, appearing 
in Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus, is that our souls have 'seen' the 
objects of knowledge before being born into bodies but forgotten 
them at birth, so that 'learning' about them is really a matter of 
recollection (anamnesis): a kind of theory of innate ideas. The pro-
posal immediately defuses any problem of separation between lan-
guage and Forms, or between human souls/minds and Forms. If such 
a theory is hardly visible outside Meno, Phaedo and Phaedrus, that 
may be because Plato elsewhere does not have in mind the kind of 
radical separation between Forms and particulars which the theory 
was designed to overcome - and which Parmenides criticizes in the 
Parmenides. Here is one case, at least, where there may be an advan-
tage in not attributing 'doctrines' to Plato. Philosophers more than 
anyone should surely be allowed not only to change their minds, but 
to entertain doubts, as Plato's own philosopher - Socrates - always 
does. 
R E A D I N G P L A T O 
None of the above, however, gives much of an idea of what it is 
actually like to read Plato. An external description of a Platonic di-
alogue must be as far from the real thing as, say, a prose paraphrase 
of a poem. Among the things inevitably missed is the indirectness 
of Plato's technique. If the author never appears (he is twice referred 
to, fleetingly), by and large it is not difficult to locate the authorial 
voice, usually behind the main speaker. But this does not mean that 
one can read through the text to the authorial mind. The strategies 
of the character Socrates are often less than straightforward; at least 
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in the shorter dialogues they are typically responses to particular 
interlocutors in particular contexts, and reading off more general 
outcomes can be a ticklish matter. The longer dialogues can appear 
more transparent, and perhaps they are, but then their sheer variety, 
combined with the fact that most are formally independent of each 
other, makes life hardly any easier for the interpreter. And then, on 
top of this, there is the way in which they tend to mimic - or pretend 
to mimic - the unpredictability of ordinary conversations. All of this 
illustrates the point made earlier about the unsystematic nature of 
the corpus, its essential messiness. That does not necessarily mean 
that the thought behind it is messy (though it might be), but it is as 
well to be aware of the appearance of the original material. 
Consider now, by way of example, three shorter dialogues and two 
longer: 
(a) Euthyphro. Euthyphro and Socrates are both involved with the 
Athenian legal authorities: Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father 
for homicide, while Socrates will soon be in court on trial for his life. 
Euthyphro is something of a religious expert, just the sort of person 
to discuss the nature of hosiotës (piety/propriety?) with Socrates. 
Asked what hosiotës is, a typical form of question in the shorter di-
alogues (though also asked in longer ones, such as Theaetetus), he 
begins with the proposal that it's what he's doing now, prosecuting 
his father. When this fails, he comes up with other proposals, mostly 
prompted by Socrates, but none stands up to scrutiny, and at the end 
the conversation comes full circle; Socrates suggests they need to 
start all over again, but Euthyphro has urgent business elsewhere. In 
fact, several philosophical points have been made along the way, and 
near the end Socrates suggests, without explaining, that Euthyphro 
was almost there. Questions: (1) Does he mean it? (2) If he does, 
which bit was almost right? And (3) why does Plato allow the con-
versation to stop there? 
(b) Crito. Socrates is in prison awaiting execution, and his close 
associate Crito comes to urge him to escape. Socrates instead takes 
the opportunity to do some philosophy: are Crito's reasons for his 
escaping any good, and do they trump the rational conclusions they'd 
reached in previous discussions? It's never good to harm anyone, 
even in return for harm, and breaking agreements with people does 
harm to them; his escaping when condemned by due process would 
break an agreement with, and harm, the laws (he imagines them 
addressing him); so it won't be a good thing for him to escape, even if 
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he was condemned unjustly. And the reader knows that he is in fact 
executed. Modern liberal-minded readers, wanting to take Socrates as 
a model, often find themselves embarrassed by what appears to be an 
implied blanket argument against resistance to the state even when 
the state is wrong. The laws' arguments do not obviously look strong, 
yet Socrates' says that they are 'buzzing in his ears', and preventing 
him from hearing anything else. So did he die unnecessarily? Or is 
Plato's own real point a different one? 
(c) Lysis. Socrates finds himself in a new gymnasium, where he 
meets Hippothales, lover of the boy Lysis, then Lysis and Lysis' friend 
Menexenus. Socrates starts by teaching Hippothales a lesson about 
how to talk to a beloved, i.e. by humbling him. Socrates, Lysis and 
Menexenus then discuss what it is that loves and what is loved. What 
we love is evidently that for which we say we love other things, 
the 'first friend', something good not loved for the sake of some-
thing else,· what loves is the neither good (knowledgeable) nor bad 
(wholly ignorant). The final conclusion of the main argument is that 
the true lover, sc. the one who truly loves what he says he loves, 
must necessarily be loved by the beloved (222a) - and after all, who 
would not love someone who loves them and knows what is truly 
lovable? (Hippothales, understanding nothing, is delighted.) But now 
the participants reach an impasse, apparently because the two boys 
ultimately cannot accept the paradoxical results of the argument. 
Readers, too, are faced with the choice: accept the argument, or go 
with the boys and say what's wrong with the argument. 
(d) Phaedrus. Socrates meets Phaedrus, in an idyllic setting out-
side the city-walls; Phaedrus, a devotee of the orator Lysias, has a 
speech of Lysias' tucked under his clothes. After reading the speech, 
on 'Why a beloved should give in to someone who doesn't love him 
rather than someone who does', Socrates responds with two speeches 
of his own, one for the thesis and one - an inspired speech - against 
it. The second speech first argues for the soul's immortality, and 
then in mythical mode compares the tripartite soul to a charioteer 
and his pair of horses, white and black, promising at least tempo-
rary escape from incarnation for the true lover, the soul that has 
lived three successive philosophical lives with no concessions to the 
black horse of appetite. Such a soul will soar through the heavens 
with the gods, and will hope to get another sight of the Forms, be-
yond the heavens, at the ten-thousand-yearly feast the gods enjoy. 
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After this speech, Socrates discusses with Phaedrus what makes for 
good and bad writing and speaking, developing a theory of philosoph-
ical rhetoric, and finally devaluing writing by comparison with living 
dialectic and its capacity to collect and divide: the expert dialectician 
is the true sower of immortal seed in others' souls. 
(e) Philebus. The eponymous Philebus supports pleasure as the 
candidate for what constitutes the Good in the good life; Socrates 
supports knowledge. The dialogue begins with these protagonists 
at loggerheads, and with one Protarchus taking over Philebus' case. 
The conversation ends, however, with the conclusion that, although 
knowledge ranks ahead of pleasure, the Good itself is neither of these 
but the combination of beauty, measure and truth that regulates their 
mixture. The dialogue mostly consists in a detailed analysis of plea-
sure and pleasures, preceded by a - dialogical - excursus on method 
and its metaphysical presuppositions: the passage on Limit and the 
Unlimited (see above, pp. 109, 115-16), which also have a product 
and a cause. The excursus seems to go considerably beyond what 
is required for the discussion that follows, and in many respects is 
more suggestive than explicit. Is this because Plato has more up his 
sleeve than he is telling us, or because he hasn't? 
ALTERNATIVE READINGS 
The lack of determinacy in the Platonic texts, and their variety 
and complexity, have unsurprisingly spawned numerous interpre-
tative strategies. Of these, the oldest and most general may be 
labelled respectively the 'dogmatic' (or 'doctrinal') and the 'sceptical' 
tendencies. Plato's immediate successors in the Academy contin-
ued with the kind of ambitious metaphysical schemes hinted at in 
the Philebus-, but not so long afterwards the 'New' Academy (see 
chapter 6) was treating Plato as a sceptic - an approach which, like 
its opposite, can easily be justified by privileging some parts of the 
corpus and downplaying others. 'Dogmatic' types of interpretation 
then regained the ascendancy, giving rise to what we label as the 
'Middle Platonists' and the Neoplatonists, whose idea of Platonism 
remained the one most widely accepted until the modern period. 
Both 'dogmatic' and 'sceptical' modes of interpretation have their 
modern analogues: the former, for example, in the 'esoteric' read-
ing of Plato, or in the Straussian, the latter in what may broadly be 
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termed the 'analytical' reading, which probably still dominates in 
the English-speaking world. 'Esoteric' interpreters find the core of 
Plato in his oral teaching, what Aristotle calls, and documents as, 
the 'unwritten doctrines'; the dialogues are more or less explicit in-
vitations to the dance. For the 'Straussians' (followers of the Platonic 
scholar and political philosopher Leo Strauss), Plato's indirectness is 
concealment: the real, subversive meaning of the philosopher - who 
must always stand in fear of suffering the fate of a Socrates - needs 
to be looked for, by the trained reader, under the surface. 
A caricature of an 'analytical' interpreter would identify him as 
one who formalizes whatever can be formalized and discards the 
rest; or who sees no difference between a dialogical argument and 
its monological counterpart. The extreme form of self-consciously 
'literary' interpretations will, by contrast, tend to treat the arguments 
of the dialogues as secondary. 
It is the analytical interpreters who have probably most enthusias-
tically embraced the 'developmental' model referred to at pp. 104-6 
above, partly because of a fundamental commitment to the idea of 
progress in philosophy: development in this case implies improve-
ment, and correction of mistakes, perhaps even the abandonment 
of metaphysics; and in any case for the analytical Plato it is finally 
argument that matters, not grand conclusions. 
Esoterists, Straussians and others are essentially 'unitarian' in ten-
dency - as, again, all the ancients were. That in itself may seem an 
impressive fact, though of course the ancients in question were com-
mitted Platonists, with their own axes to grind, in a way that most 
modern readers have not been. (Nor had ancient interpreters invented 
stylometry, for what that is worth.) 
There is, however, what looks like a major obstacle to any unitar-
ian interpretation: the presence, and active deployment, in a number 
of dialogues of a philosophical theory that is inconsistent with a sig-
nificant proportion of the ideas described as 'Platonic' at pp. 109-13 
above. In this group of works - which happens more or less to 
coincide with Group 1 in Diagram C (p. 104) - the starting-point, 
or the end-point, is a view of human motivation which either ex-
plicitly or implicitly denies that we can be 'overcome by (irrational) 
desire'; we cannot 'willingly go wrong'.16 So most directly in the 
Protagoras (351b ff.), but also in the Lysis, which argues that even 
the most basic, physiological desires are directed to what is truly 
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good for us; also in the Symposium, where Diotima the priestess and 
Socrates' teacher sponsors a similar argument, and in the 'dialogues 
of definition', which tend consistently to assimilate the 'virtues' (ex-
cellences) to knowledge (the Charmides treats even sôphrosynë like 
this, an excellence typically understood, and treated in Republic iv, 
as 'self-control' - a notion for which there will in fact be no room, if 
there is none for 'weakness of will'). On this theory, what motivates 
every action we perform, except under external compulsion, is our 
desire for what is, overall, good for us; and the only relevant differ-
ence between us as individuals is what we happen to believe will 
contribute to that good. (We shall also probably be attracted by other 
things, but will not go for them unless we think that best. The qual-
ity of our actions, then, is determined by the quality of our beliefs; 
hence the name given to the theory, 'intellectualism'.) 
To be human, in this case, will be simply to be rational: there is no 
beast in us, to be whipped, cajoled or conditioned into quietness, and 
the only way of changing people's behaviour will be to talk to them, 
to give them reasons for changing. This is the position against which 
Plato's Socrates appears to be arguing in Book iv of the Republic, 
when he introduces the tripartite soul, one third rational and two 
thirds irrational;17 for he specifically argues both that the desires of 
the irrational 'parts' have their own, non-rational, objects, and that 
they are capable of overcoming our rational, good-directed desires. 
(So now there will be a need for irrational modes of control. The 
political dimension in Plato, and indeed many other aspects of his 
thinking, seem vitally dependent on the argument of Republic iv. 
The intellectualist Socrates is no political theorist; nor, as it happens, 
does he have much interest in science, or in the idea of an immortal 
soul.) 
Aristotle is familiar with this kind of theory, which he consis-
tently attributes to the real Socrates. But, like many moderns, he 
does not think much of it, discovering the real difference between 
Socrates and Plato in the latter's 'separation' of Forms (see pp. 104-5, 
109-10 above). Here too Aristotle's judgement has been influen-
tial, for the distinction between 'early' and 'middle' in Diagram Β 
(p. 103 above) is essentially based on this point of his (i.e. about 
'separation'). Socratic intellectualism, for its part, is nowadays fre­
quently held to be easily falsifiable and therefore uninteresting. Yet 
Plato evidently did not easily dismiss the Socratic theory - partly, 
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perhaps, because he understood it better. Aristotle complains, among 
other things (and moderns have again taken up the refrain), that it 
leaves out the factor of motivation and/or emotion, which - as Plato 
works it out - it plainly does not: what drives us, on the theory in 
question, is precisely desire for the good. It may even be that Plato 
thought he was improving on Socrates in Republic iv, not aban­
doning him, insofar as his substantive views on the nature of the 
good life remained unaltered. Again, even if he thought - or came to 
think - that not all desires were for the good, he nevertheless still 
thought that every soul, every person, desires the good, qua rational 
(the idea of desire for the merely apparent good is an Aristotelian 
invention). But the consequences of the shift in other respects 
are considerable - and much greater than those of metaphysical 
'separation' (from Aristotle's point of view, 'separated' Forms rep­
resent a massive philosophical mistake, but there seem to be few 
implications for ethics). 
If Plato thought there was continuity even here between him­
self and Socrates, then perhaps honours will yet be even between 
developmentalists and unitarians. However the more important 
point, in the present context, is that Plato himself seems finally to 
have decided against the 'intellectualist' view. It is of course conceiv­
able that he started with the anti-intellectualist, irrationalist, model 
of the human mind, and later moved into what Aristotle firmly 
identifies as the Socratic camp; but if stylometry shows anything, it 
seems consistently to show that Plato's interest in the intellectualist 
position came earlier rather than later. And it is the general theme of 
a conflict between reason and unreason that dominates works like 
Republic, Phaedrus, Statesman, Timaeus-Critias and Laws - and 
through them, the corpus as a whole. This, together with the belief 
in philosophy and the difference it makes to life (because contribut­
ing to the victory of reason over unreason, of order over disorder) has 
every claim to be called properly 'Platonic'. 
NOTES 
ι The Seventh Letter, even if not genuine, will probably add to this scant 
list of biographical items three visits to Syracuse in Sicily and some sort 
of political involvement there. The author of the letter echoes Socrates' 
famous declaration in the Republic that 'until philosophers rule as kings 
or those presently called kings... philosophize... cities will have no 
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respite from evils' (473c-d), and has Plato unsuccessfully attempting 
to turn the young Syracusan tyrant Dionysius II into a philosopher (cf. 
pp. 107-13 below, and Republic vi, especially 502a-b). Maybe it was on 
his Italian travels that Plato encountered Pythagoreanism (though there 
were also Pythagoreans visiting and resident in mainland Greece) For 
other more certainly fictional travels attributed to Plato, see chapter 9, 
pp. 251-2. 
2 Cf. Hankinson, p. 282 this volume, for a contrast of such ideological 
explanation with mere 'mechanistic causes'. These latter, on the Pla-
tonic account, will belong to the sphere of 'necessity', on which see 
p. 109. 
3 To the extent that the existence of the Demiurge is inferred from the 
'goodness' of the phenomenal world, it too will be subject to the same 
caveat, i.e. 'likely' but not certain,· and in fact the gods are one of only two 
examples Timaeus uses in spelling out his point about the mere l ike-
liness' of the following account ('so in many cases about many things, 
about gods and the coming-into-being of the all': 29c). So the evidence 
is that there was a creation, and a Creator, but the evidence is not that 
good. 
4 A more usual interpretation of the myth has just two stages in each 
cycle, with the world - puzzlingly - in reverse for the whole of the 
(ideal?) age of Cronus. 
5 'Irrationality' here is defined by opposition to the dictates of reason. 
Reason is naturally directed towards the good; 'appetitive' desires are for 
food, drink, sex, and so on, without reference to whether these objects 
are good or not. See further below, and p. 121. 
6 The second, 'spirited', part, though the natural ally of reason, is also ir-
rational and also has projects of its own: the maintenance of self-esteem, 
winning, and so on. 
7 The extended argument to this effect in Book iv of the Republic has a 
good claim to being one of the most important in Plato. See pp. 120-2 
below, and p. 25 above, where part of the argument is cited. 
8 A 'healthy' city will be a wise one, ruled by wisdom and reason in its 
rulers; it will in fact be one where all three constituent groups, rulers, 
soldiers and producers, do 'what belongs to them' - and so will also be 
'just', 'justice' being defined as 'doing one's own'. Courage it will have 
from its properly trained - and obedient - soldiers, and 'self-control' 
from the agreement of all three groups about who should rule. All the 
'political' virtues thus relate essentially to the single factor of the rule 
of wisdom. 
9 The 'Cave' reference is to the great simile J5i4a-5i8d) that rounds off 
the group of three in Republic vi-vu. If the gap between rulers and 
ruled is much narrower in Plato's other imaginary city, in the Laws, 
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this evidently has as much to do with the exclusion of ordinary people 
from the citizen-body as with any relaxation in the requirements for 
rulership (as laid out in their most extreme form in the Statesman). 
io Phaedo ii4d. This is rather different from the 'likelihood' of the 
Timaeus' cosmology: there the account was (only) 'likely' because of 
problems with the evidence, whereas here the problem is that there 
is no evidence at all - which is one reason for moving into 'mythical' 
mode. 
11 The universe for Plato is a sphere of limited size (its boundary being 
marked by the fixed stars), and there is no other dimension for things 
to enter; souls must evidently always be located somewhere within 
the universe itself. From this point of view, once given that souls are 
immortal, the Pythagorean theory of their 'transmigration' from body 
to body looks economical enough. 
12 'Testing', 'examining', and 'refuting' all fall within the scope of the cen-
tral Greek root in this area: elench-, as in the verb elenchein, and the 
noun elenchos. 
13 Being and difference, along with sameness, motion and rest, constitute 
the five 'greatest kinds' (megista gene) on whose complex interrelation 
the Sophist relies for its solution to the problem of how false statement 
is possible. 
14 The Phaedo neatly illustrates the essential points: four arguments 
(roughly) for immortality, each successive argument designed to im-
prove on its predecessor(s), and a final one that - Socrates promises 
(107b) - will deliver the goods, with some further work. 
15 See especially Cratylus. Contrast also the frequent talk of 'seeing' the 
objects of knowledge in Books vi-vn of the Republic with the subse-
quent description in Book vu of what dialectic can actually achieve: a 
grasp that consists of statements not so far refuted (534b-c). 
16 See chapter 3, p. 94 above. How much of the working-out of the theory 
we find in Plato had already been done by Socrates is impossible to 
tell; if it was mostly done by Plato, still it is evidently what the original 
Socratic position required, and so may to that extent count as genuinely 
Socratic. 
17 Tripartition in Plato sometimes gives way to bipartition, as e.g. in 
the Laws, where he shows less interest in treating the aggressive/ 
competitive as a distinct aspect of humanity's irrational side. 
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